

(The following is a condensed and slightly edited version of the report given by Lew Jones to the New York branch on Nov. 16, including some contributions from the floor.)

Several things have occurred that are key to understanding the present juncture of the antiwar movement.

First: after October 21, for the first time, there was no post-demonstration downturn or pessimism. There has been a wave of student actions prior to and after October 21 which have set the pace and character of the antiwar movement. Oakland, Brooklyn, and Madison built and to a large extent set the tone and character for October 21. After October 21 the same type of actions, on campus after campus, kept the momentum going, kept the initiative alive.

The student wing of the antiwar movement views itself quite correctly as the initiator of actions and the most militant wing. Moreover, the non-student sections have approximately the same view. They see the student wing as the militant section, as the section which initiates and leads the actions. That was true, for instance, at the SANE trade union conference last week end where several speakers referred to the student antiwar movement in this light.

Two: various layers and leaders in the antiwar movement have shifted their opinions and attitudes on certain questions. There has recently been a number of trips to Hanoi and Czechoslovakia organized primarily by Dellinger and the radical pacifists. To a large measure those who have gone have come back with a greater understanding of the antiwar movement. The Vietnamese have evidently impressed upon them the importance of the antiwar movement, the coalition, mass action, and a sympathetic attitude toward the plight of American GIs. Because of this Vietnamese influence and other factors, we're seeing a further deepening of the split in the pacifist movement, and, moreover, a turn on the part of at least a section of SDS towards more cooperation with the antiwar movement and more joint activity with it.

Third: the administration itself has helped out a little. Their very attitude has driven more and more people into opposition to the war. In the face of growing opposition to the war at home and abroad, Johnson arrogantly continues to go right ahead and lay further war plans. In the face of greater anti-draft sentiment General Hershey, head of the Selective Service, announced he intends to use the draft as a punitive measure against antiwar activists.

Fourth: as a result of October 21 the idea of the coalition character of the antiwar movement has taken root among greater numbers of people. I can't really put my finger on why this is.

Perhaps it's because the coalition itself was in a crisis before October 21. Then, when October 21 was a success, the coalition reflected that and became more confident of itself. This was reflected in last week end's National Mobilization Committee's Administrative Committee meeting where everyone there, with one or two exceptions, thought that the coalition should proceed to organize more mass actions. The exceptions were Greenblatt and Beinin. Beinin's proposal was to split the National Mobilization Committee into two Mobilizations, one for the "dissenters" and one for the "resisters." I'll come back to that later.

Fifth: on October 21 the American antiwar movement, with us playing a key role, vanguarded a synchronized and semi-coordinated international mass action against the war. And those actions in many countries (such as Japan, Germany, and England) were the largest and most militant that have been seen in decades. Most of these demonstrations occurred outside the official framework of the Communist Parties and Socialist Parties. Events like October 21 thus give revolutionaries a tremendous lever to make inroads into the young members of the CP's and SP's around the world.

International coordinated activity has reached such a state now that what you might call a growing international antiwar movement is looking to the United States to call and lead the next action. Already in the SWP and YSA offices and in the Student Mobilization Committee office, letters are coming in and asking "Well, what next? When's the next date? What are we going to do?"

What do these five changes in the antiwar movement require of us? That is, what are our main lines of activity because of these changes? Three things emerge. First, we want to tie into the student activities. It's obvious there is a rapid expansion of antiwar sentiment among students. We want to see the Student Mobilization Committee accelerate that process and organize it. The possibility of building a larger and broader SMC exists, and we must do what we can to help organize it.

Second, it's important that the date for the spring action be set sometime soon. Both the needs of the movement here and around the world require this.

Third, it's now apparent that antiwar sentiment has reached such a level that it is possible to organize massive demonstrations in most major cities in this country, and in much of the world. If the antiwar movement puts out a call for such demonstrations I think we'll even see sizeable demonstrations in cities that we would never expect. So our call in the coming period and hopefully the call of the entire antiwar movement must be for thousands of October 21's in as many cities in the world as possible, not a single concentration in New York or Washington.

Of these three main lines that we want to emphasize in the coming period, we have to give special consideration to the youth

situation.

We are witnessing an explosion of activism among youth. We've seen protests against CIA, Dow, and campus military recruiters, and protests against the draft, which have occurred on campus after campus day after day. Secondly, we've seen a shift of opinion and approach by some leaders and a section of SDS toward the program of the Student Mobilization Committee. The recent demonstrations have also revolved around the line of the SMC: Bring the Troops Home Now, Stop the Draft, and End Campus Complicity.

With these developments we're involved in something on the scale of previous turning points in the antiwar movement. What we're seeing once again is new forces being drawn toward our central conception of what the student antiwar movement ought to be and how it ought to be organized. Way back about two years ago we put forward the idea that the students, the left wing of the antiwar movement, ought to be organized independently into a national organization of the committees to end the war or whatever local antiwar groups there were.

The idea of an independently organized student wing was first initiated at the Assembly of Unrepresented People in August of 1965. At the NCC conference, after a political fight, the Newsletter was set up to fight for this proposal. We went through a lot of experiences with the Newsletter. The movement finally got to the point where the Student Mobilization Committee was organized, which was the concrete example of our line. Now we're at a stage where we can draw in even more people around the Student Mobilization Committee, namely some sections that have here to now been hostile--parts and sections of SDS, the anti-draft activists, and the activists in the campus complicity demonstrations.

One of the most important issues in this stage of the development is the draft. The draft has always been an important issue for us and for the movement itself. Our tactical approach on the draft has varied with each stage of the movement.

Throughout the history of the movement we've put forward three cautions on the draft issue. First, we opposed individual acts against the draft becoming the tactical norm instead of mass militant actions. Experience showed that individual acts only alienated people and connoted cowardice and draft-dodging. It plainly was not a good tactic, and we opposed it on those grounds. We sought instead to have mass militant actions. For example on October 15-16, 1965, we opposed the SDS attempt to make individual acts against the draft the tactical norm for the movement.

Secondly, we at various times in the movement have opposed the draft becoming a substitute for the general antiwar protest. The most notable diversionary tactic was the attempt to get the

Draft

antiwar movement to pressure liberal Congressmen to reform or repeal the draft. The National Coordinating Committee even went so far as to try to set up a lobbying service in Washington for this purpose. The CP at times has been quite active on this particular line of using the draft issue to turn the movement into reformist politics and pressuring liberal Congressmen.

The third caution: we've resisted upon occasion the presentation of the draft issue in such isolation that it became a substitute for a sympathetic attitude towards the GIs, and, in fact, became a negation of a sympathetic attitude towards the troops.

Throughout the history of the antiwar movement, our attitude towards the draft has always been that we stand for its complete abolition. Yet, we've always been flexible in how we've approached the draft question. Our tactics, like all tactics, were fixed by the objective situation itself, and by the attitude of our opponents. Because the sentiment against the draft had not reached any massive depths, and because our opponents had the leverage to misuse the issue of the draft, we, for the most part, chose to downplay the draft issue. We didn't downplay it on principle, we downplayed it because it was not tactically profitable for the antiwar movement. As an example, when the Student Mobilization Committee was set up it had three demands, Bring the GIs Home, End Campus Complicity, and End the Draft. We supported the inclusion of the anti-draft demand but in the Student Mobilization Committee, both nationally and locally, we threw our forces into building other things; we didn't get involved in many of the end the draft activities.

But now things are changed, and it's plain to see that it is to our tactical advantage not only to push the draft issue but to throw ourselves into the protests that are developing around the draft, like December 4-8. Sentiment is quite a bit deepened in this country--37% for withdrawal in San Francisco. We've always said that when antiwar sentiment deepens, the draft issue will become more a significant issue. Our opponents have been put on the defensive, by and large, on this issue. What has developed is ripe for our approach, and we must take the offensive on the draft issue and in the coming activities. The tactical cautions we advanced earlier are not the same threat at this stage.

The Oakland demonstration indicated quite graphically what had changed and what is now possible. The demonstration there was massive, sympathetic to draftees, part of the antiwar movement, and a significant shift from pacifist individual tactics to tactics of self-defense.

In the past few months there has been an evolution of groups throughout the country that are opposed to the draft, such as the Resistance here in New York, CADRE in Chicago, and groups like the one in Seattle which has had meetings of 200 people. On the whole these groups have attracted fresh, serious activists, not hardened factionalists, not people out to kill the antiwar movement, but fresh activists who see the draft protest as part of the general antiwar fight.

protest. They're open minded on how to conduct their protest. They're quite willing to listen and to learn; and they're very militantly disposed, being against, by and large, individual pacifist tactics. These groups erupted into activity around October 21, in conjunction with it, and saw it as part of building October 21. Since then we've learned that these groups are willing, with variations here and there, to work on a united front basis with the organized antiwar movement, which is an opening the antiwar movement must take maximum advantage of.

We're now entering a stage where further expansion of the antiwar movement is possible, particularly in the Student Mobilization. There are two events that are coming up that we want to concentrate on, build, and help provide leadership for in order to maximize these opportunities. First is the December 4-8 Stop the Draft week. The national Student Mobilization Committee has called for these actions. Already in New York a broad united front has developed, which can serve as a prototype for other areas to build large actions at the appropriate place to release all draftees, bring the GIs home, and stop the draft.

Then we want to build the January Student Mobilization conference into the biggest possible conference, where these local united front formations can be taken to a national level. With such a broader SMC the antiwar movement can go out of that conference ready to build the next big action, and particularly the international student strike.

In that context let's discuss the December 4-8 protest and what the November 14 demonstration in New York means for December 4-8. The Nov. 14 demonstration was a contradictory one. First, on the positive side, it was a very massive demonstration--near 10,000 people. With only 10 days worth of publicity. It was a success, stealing the headlines from Rusk and Sato's support of the war.

There were negative sides to the demonstration, nonetheless. What occurred was a sliding over into ultra-leftism when the demonstration disintegrated and groups went down the streets, especially down 5th and 6th Avenues, and down side streets committing ... disrupting traffic, taunting the police, and getting it from the police.

Why did this occur? First of all, the police themselves thought this demonstration through in advance, and attempted to break up the mass. It was like a state of siege. I felt like a steer being led to the slaughter, trying to wind my way to the demonstration through all the barricades. The Parade Committee pointed out that the police would not allow the marshalls to lead the crowd; they would not let marshalls go from one block to the next to coordinate things.

In addition, the marshalls themselves were not that well organized. As a matter of fact, you could say that this demonstration was almost completely without leadership. There was

nobody there to take the militancy of that crowd and organize it around a focal point like trying to link up the demonstrators rather than having them separated all over the area. When that occurred, confirmed ultraleftists took the lead, grabbed bullhorns, led contingents away from the demonstration into unnecessary fights with the cops.

If this type of demonstration were to become the tactical norm of the antiwar movement, it would lead to precisely what Beinin advocates for the National Mobilization Committee--two antiwar movements, one for the "resisters," who would go out and get their heads beat, and one for the "dissenters" who would stay home and watch it on television. In such an eventuality everything would turn right around. The coalition as a whole, and particularly the moderate groups, would turn on the youth, accusing the youth of being the ones that are holding the movement back, rather than as things are now, where the coalition looks to the youth to be the most active, and the initiators of actions.

Our key, the thing we're after, is what Dellinger, in his own fashion, outlined in his letter to the N.Y. Times Oct. 31, where he says that the concept the movement is organized around is "from dissent to resistance" which means, in this latest interpretation, the coalition embraces all groups from the "dissenters" to the "resisters."

What do these things mean for the Dec. 6 demonstration in New York? It's been a little unclear til now in the ad hoc coalition exactly what the demonstration was supposed to accomplish. The leaflet says, "be there with thousands to close the draft board" which nobody in that coalition actually believes. It's just a way of seizing upon a phrase to make it sound like the demonstration's going to be militant. But the problem is, it is not a truthful statement of aims and a credibility gap can develop. We have had the most problems with defensive formalations--getting people to understand the importance of them, and the importance of telling the truth to the antiwar movement about what you're there for. What do we want to see occur, or what do we see as a political purpose to this demonstration? We would like to see this demonstration be a massive protest of the draft. We would like it to be a massive demonstration demanding the right to talk to the draftees. We would like nothing better than to see 10 or 20 thousand people massed in front of that draft board demanding to talk to the draftees, not just for a minute, but for a couple of hours. After all, the army's going to get these guys for two years, and the antiwar movement should have the right to discuss it's ideas with them for a couple of hours. Moreover, it also has the right to mass right in front of that draft board to show these draftees the size and scope of the antiwar movement.

We feel that it is quite important that these plans, or

whatever plans are adopted be publicized in advance, with precise details. That was one of the problems with November 14th. The details of the demonstration were not publicized in advance, and consequently, the cops could get away with anything they wanted to, putting the onus on the Parade Committee for disrupting things. There'll be a press conference of the Stop the Draft Committee coalition to publicize precisely what it's going to do-- to get it out, get it known, so the police know what's going on and what's expected of them, so the press knows, and particularly so the public and the people coming to the demonstration know.

There are a couple of other things we want to do at the demonstration.

On the marshalls. People come to the massive antiwar demonstrations and they have difficulty in determining who the leaders are. One of the things that has to be done at this demonstration is that the marshalls have to be clearly distinguishable, even if they have to wear orange signs that say "marshall."

Secondly, it is quite important that we organize ourselves in a disciplined manner to be part of this marshalling team. We want to be leading marshalls at this demonstration, to make sure the thing goes right. We cannot afford, and the antiwar movement cannot afford, to let these demonstrations and the marshalls fall into the hands of the ultra-lefts, the nuts, and the provocateurs.

The third thing we want to do on Dec. 6, and the central thing, is to mass the demonstration at the draft board, not see the demonstration spread out to Wall St. and over to the Staten Island Ferry and so on--the kind of thing that occurred on Nov. 14. The committee will discuss this with the police, get their agreement, and then, if they go back on their agreement, then the onus is on the cops.

FRED:

The key to this will be what we do. We are the most cohesive, and as far as organized forces are concerned, the largest group in the New York movement. We want to take the reins of the actual, technical marshalling of this next demonstration. We have bigger problems now than in past demonstrations and we'll have to do it in a much more organized, much more disciplined way, and we'll need everybody. The most important thing in this is for all of our people to understand just what it is we want to get out of this demonstration. If we get the kind of tone that has been described, established and well known as broadly as possible in the movement, it will tend to make the rest of it much easier, because people who have not been instructed, or do not know exactly what they're supposed to do on the scene, if they have a general idea what the purpose of the thing is, and agree with it, they can use their own common sense to some extent. And the political line here is that we want this to be a massive, visible demonstration, which tells to the entire country, the size of the antiwar movement, and the fact that the antiwar movement is discussing with, and trying to win over, draftees to opposition to the war.

Second, this is a demonstration which has come out of the initiative of the youth, but we want the rest of the coalition there also. We want the mothers of the draftees, and of anybody who might be drafted sometime within the next ten years. We want mothers there to talk to draftees, to inspire the rest of the antiwar movement and the people generally across the country that the thing for them to do is support the draftees who want out, to pick up the idea of freeing the draftees and to talk to the troops and anybody who is subjected to this stuff of being dragged away to a war.

That's what we want to accomplish. Just as at the next stage we can do that with the actual GIs. We will have the perfectly proper, legal situation, and also extremely militant situation, where fraternization between the antiwar movement and the people that the army's trying to brainwash. We want veterans there, old people, middle class people, draftees, and youth. The general call or shout that comes out on some of the demonstrations of "Join us, join us," is good, great stuff. We want this whole crowd to say, "Join us" to everybody around, to the bus drivers, and to the GIs, that happen to be walking by, to everybody but the police. Let them stand aside and be gentle.

We don't want any bottles, or swinging at cops, or taunting of cops or newsmen. I saw that come out again at this thing on Nov. 14. We went through that big lecture before, during the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Each and every one of us must lecture as many people as we can, in the antiwar movement,

that there is absolutely nothing to gain from taunting newsmen. It is the most foolish thing you can conceivably do. If you get half a chance of getting a decent break out of these guys that's the last way in the world to get it. Incidentally, it just happens to be the fact now that a good number of them are antiwar. And even if they weren't, if they were all right wing reactionaries, which some of them are, they've got you at the disadvantage, and there's nothing to be gained from taunting them on the scene. Just be polite and correct with them, that's all. And talk naturally, "Join us, join us," give us a break.

There is no percentage in taunting cops. And there never has been, under any conditions. When you're in a position where you want to use your mass presence to express to them that the wise thing for them to do is to allow you to do what they're supposed to allow you to do, and picket where you're supposed to be, then you have nothing at all to gain from taunting. Just as a matter of fact, you'll intimidate them more by all of these other kinds of actions, of asking the general public to join you, of having a spectrum of the movement there, appealing to the GIs, etc. So we've got to take our understanding of this into the movement, and to explain it to as many people as we can. Then act as a disciplined force ourselves.

BARRY

People like PL and Workers World and some sections of SDS are incorrigible ultra-leftists. They are ultra-leftists for their own political reasons. There are other groups like the Resistance groups which have been ultra-leftist, but which have been coming towards the coalition. The ways we want to approach these two types are different.

Groups like the Resistance reflect, I think, a more general phenomenon amongst many of the students. This kind of ultra-leftism grown out of a frustration that the war continues and they want to find something more meaningful than simply carrying a sign; from lack of understanding of the long term nature of the struggle and what it's going to take to stop the war; from a lack of experience with police.

These initial impulses towards ultra-leftism can reflect developing, immature radicalization, and we want to draw this radicalism out in a political direction.

The worst thing we could do is to turn our backs on these youth. That would just give all those kids right over into the hands of the real ultra-lefts. That's a little of what happened at the demonstration. Some of the real ultra-leftist could come in with a bullhorn and these youth would say, alright, it sounds militant, let's go do that.

We want to reach these militants, embrace them, and bring our consciousness to them of what should be done on these demonstrations: explain to them why they shouldn't split

themselves off from the mass, explain to them ways in which they don't have to split themselves off from the mass and still be very militant.

The movement has entered a new stage. The increased militancy of these kids reflects the increased militancy among the whole mass of the antiwar movement and the increased opposition to the war amongst the whole mass of the population. This is just the most advanced section of it. We're faced with a growing, developing movement. It's going to present us with problem after problem. It's never going to be a nice perfect little movement the way we would like to have it if we were writing a paper on it.

We've just left behind a whole set of problems. Let's be very happy that we've left behind a whole set of them and that we've got a whole new set. We've now got to tell militant kids, who want to battle the state, how to do it properly; how to make their militancy really effective. That's a problem on a higher level.

The fundamental thing that happened was an expression of the deepening antiwar sentiment and a rise in militancy among a whole mass of young people which, if it's channeled correctly, can be connected with a larger mass and bring it also along to a higher level.

JACK

We're at one of the turning points in the antiwar movement now. This is one of the four or five points that we've gone through in the last 2½ years which the party must reorient itself towards. We must reach into the movement and reorient it.

What we've reached is a new higher level of the contradiction between the mass of the American people who are against the war and the vanguard that acts in the streets in actions against the war; another contradiction between the young activists that make up the active young demonstrating wing of the movement and the moderate and/or older and/or established and/or not-ultra-left organizations. And once again, as at every turn we've gone through, in these street actions, the movement pays for the tremendous lack of experience. It has never being a mass movement before. It's not these people's fault--it's their age and what happened before them that determines that they've never had any experience in mass struggle. It's nothing they can control. And it's not their fault that the labor movement is not involved in the struggle. And so we have a new leap forward of the movement and a whole new series of contradictions.

And what that means is that we have got to genuinely exert ourselves in the coming couple of weeks in New York and in the coming few months in the country as a whole, in an especially hard

manner, to orient and make the direction of the antiwar movement the correct one.

We've got to be at those marshall's meetings. We've got to fight for hegemony as much as we can to get the proper tactical considerations through now. We're at a very important point for that. We don't have to worry about the militancy, the numbers, the spirit, or the opposition to U.S. imperialism. We don't have to worry about that at all--that's all there just bubbling--waiting for Rusk, MacNamara, or any other "leader" to come to any city in the country. They pour out in the thousands.

What we've got to worry about is getting ourselves within the leadership of the active marshalling groups, the leafletting groups, the groups that have some authority at the time of the demonstration, to put the correct tactical stamp on it. We must try to take the experience that we have, either through our personal experience or the acquired experience of the party itself over decades of struggle in the mass movement into this movement.

This is one of those turning points where our experience is valuable.

The whole thing that we face now began about three weeks before October 21st, and went through the Oakland demonstration and the wave of campus action during and after the 21st, and the action here in New York. There are some excesses, there are some tactical errors, but the entire thing is positive. It represents an entire layer of the population that have a new militancy. Whenever intellectuals begin shaking a little bit, whenever young people come out and demonstrate, what they do is reflect basic changes in a broader strata of the population, the working people included, that they are beginning to feel.

Our general attitude in previous periods towards thin layers of super-militants and kids around the draft have been to turn our backs upon those actions in the interest of concentrating our attention on the mass mobilizations and on the organized antiwar movement. That's a blunt way of putting it but I think it's close to being true. We've tended to turn our backs upon those actions. We did it consciously. We made a tactical decision that these things were 1) diversionary and 2) represented a thin strata of the activists and we could mobilize much broader numbers in another direction. What has happened is we have come to a place where two streams meet: the antiwar activists themselves in and around the organizations we've been active in and these kids, who've been antidraft militants and some other kind of militants with some ultra-left overtones have become one, or are tending to become one in different cities of the country. To turn our backs on them now would be a right wing error on our part. Don't mix up the Youth Against War and Facism, and groups like Spartacists and PL with the average kid going down to the draft board and sneering at a cop. We can influence them to build massive demonstrations and not individual actions and to build militant,

not pacifist type demonstrations.

We can convince them quite easily, as we struggle over time, to tie the war and the draft completely together. Today's anti-draft activists don't think of anti-draft activity at all as a substitute for fighting the war. It's part of the fight against the war in Vietnam.

We've been amazed thus far at the degree to which these forces are willing to realize a linkup between their fight against the draft and their connection with the draftees and the troops as all part of one single struggle.

We were the only ones in the movement a year ago who thought that this was true, remember. We said the fight against the draft, the fight to win over the draftees, and the fight to win over the troops with the mass of American people participating was one struggle and we shouldn't do anything to cut the sectors apart. We sounded like nuts to most of these people, and now we find a growing number of people accept this.

We must 1) turn these actions by the youth themselves into the most correct tactical direction which means massing in towards the objective, and using defensive formulations, not stringing out and using provocative actions.

But 2), we've got to fight very hard to tie in the established so-called conservative, the moderate, the adult or whatever you want to call it, antiwar movement and traditional organizations in with this new layer of people. We don't want just youth. We want 10,-20,-30,000 youth but we want 10,-20,-30,000 adults, mothers, fathers, etc. at the December 6 demonstration too.

What we're building up to by making this turn, by mobilizing these young people and moving in this direction tactically is the gigantic spring action. This coming spring there is going to be, around this world, actions, sparked and called by the American antiwar movement, and led to a large degree by the Trotskyist movement which will be the largest, most massive, antiwar actions thus far.

George W.: In addition to the factors that Lew listed about the changed situation I think that there's another that can be added and that has become apparent just recently, in the past few weeks, although its probably been maturing ever since the Washington demonstration. That is the big psychological change (and its become a political change because it's a mass psychological change) regarding the antiwar movement. The authorities and the press have had to abandon the idea that the demonstrations are ineffective, that they don't affect national policy, that they don't affect the White House, and so forth. The mass of the population apparently senses this, the demonstrators have been sensing it, and now there's no pretense about this whatsoever. I think this accounts for the fact that there wasn't the slump that we were used to seeing after each demonstration. The idea then was popular of "well demonstrations don't really accomplish anything." People who thought the war was going to be ended by demonstrations have either left or they've changed and they don't expect the demonstrations to end the war. They now regard the antiwar movement as a permanent movement and one demonstration doesn't become a letdown but rather the basis for the next one. Now politically this has become quite apparent because the administration has had to admit it and the whole press has picked this up. Policy in the White House is now affected by these demonstrations. Johnson's abandon of speaking tours, his cancellation at Syracuse on the basis that there was knowledge that there would be a demonstration, are all very significant.

The first tactic a few months ago of the Johnson administration was to give orders to all his subordinates, his cabinet members, to get out and hit the trail and talk up support of the war. That's been abandoned. This Rusk fiasco certainly marks the end of that. In fact this demonstration in New York took the play completely away from what was one of Johnson's big coups -- getting the Japanese Prime Minister to come over here and endorse the war. The thing was simply overshadowed completely by the reception that Rusk got. The administration is thinking ahead. They're in a terrible position. What is Johnson going to do? Right now he's speaking at military installations, forts and so forth where he can be well protected from demonstrators.

But, they're thinking of going into a Presidential campaign where each appearance of the President or his Vice President or top cabinet members is going to evoke an antiwar demonstration, let alone the hot summer that comes up. This has become apparent to the mass of the people. It's become apparent to the press and to the politicians. This is going to put a lot of wind into the sails of the antiwar movement.

One final point. I was very interested in hearing Lew's formulation of Stop the Draft and Release the Draftees. This formulation Release the Draftees, is a very important addition to a subsidiary slogan -- the slogan on the draft is subsidiary to our overall Bring the Troops Home -- but it's important for us to stress so that other people don't get the mistaken impression that Release the Draftees is simply release the draftees at the draft board. It is, End the Draft and Release All Draftees who are in the Army no matter where they are. Release All Draftees, as if the whole thing were illegal, these people were under coercion, release them immediately. It's the sort of thing that will be talked about among the troops because most of the Army is now a draftee army.

November 16, 1967